If these pictures don’t say fall foliage, I don’t know what does:

The only way I could fathom even trying to catch up on everything that has happened the past few weeks was by accepting that I would have to summarize rather than writing as much as I have been about individual events.

The first event which backed up my schedule was a 4-day trip to Dohuk, a town and province in the NW of Iraq. Dohuk is a wealthy and prosperous town that has real stoplights that people obey (!) and limited piles of rubble (!!!) ubiquitous to the region. The apolitical reason for Dohuk’s prosperity is its proximity to Turkey; it’s only about 20 miles from the border and hence there is a great deal of trade. It may or may not have something to do with the fact that the KDP is head hancho there, but to be honest, I am not familiar enough with Kurdish politics yet to comment with or without confidence on this.

Using the city of Dohuk as a base, we traveled to several high value locations in the region. Lalish was by far the most amazing place we visited, and one of my most amazing places I’ve visited in my life. Lalish is the Yezidis’ Mecca. It’s not a town, it is a shrine and a compound where the sheikh of Yezidi faith and about 35 members of his extended family live. The Yezidis claim that theirs was the first religion, and that Lalish is the place the universe was born. It’s old. We were given a tour of the shrine and compound by the skeikh. (Just to clarify, I’m talking about the Yezidi sheikh, not just a Yezidi sheikh, by the way.) Candles – a small q-tip sized piece of cotton in Yedizi style petri dishes of olive oil – are lit throughout the shrine which is massive and comprised of different massive stone rooms, each with different purpose and meaning. One room holds the olive oil, which has been made by the same process – a massive stone vat – since about 900 BC (this date may be slightly off)  when the shrine was built. Another is the room that holds the tomb of the first Yezidi sheikh on which people throw colorful clothes when they visit. By far one of the coolest things was indoor river, stream that is inside a cave that you have to crawl to enter; it looks a lot  like a mini aqueduct system. Outside of the main shrine, you find yourself still in the broader compound, which is all made of the same yellow shaded stone with trees, lanterns, stairwells, and smaller shrines and rooms scattered throughout. After our walk through the shrine, we were lucky enough to be invited for tea and then dinner with the sheikh’s family. We were able to encounter and meet many of the different men, women and children walking and playing around the compound. (See end of post for pictures.)

Behind Lalish ranks Amadi, or Amadiya. This town is well-known because of its location on top of a mountain:

Amadiya

The Dohuk region is also home to many of Saddam’s old vacation homes. He liked the province for its natural beauty and cool temperatures.

Saddam palace

We then traveled north to Zakho, which is only about 5 miles from Turkey and is home to this famous old bridge:

Zakho bridge

Rania souq

We had a splendid meal there and walked around the souq/ bazaar, which is pretty  much the best activity in which to engage in my opinion in any and all towns here. You’re guaranteed to pick up at least 2 awesome, unique souvenirs, and most importantly you get a great feel for the towns by the people you see and don’t see and what they are wearing.

The next weekend was also stellar because of the AUIS student party put on by Barham Salih (Kurdistan Regional Government PM and No. 1 AUIS patron) himself. The night started out with a performance by a local Kurdistan hip hop group, which included a student in my Debate Club and the most well-known Kurdish rapper, Smoky G. They were actually pretty stinking good. The rest of the night can only be described in one way: dance. We danced to traditional Kurdish and Arab music for 4 hours.

If that weekend was full of dance, the next was full of food. Last Thursday after classes, a few of us teachers took off with some students from Rania for their hometown, which is a couple hours from Sulaimani. Rania is a beautiful town with a lot of history. This was the place the 1991 Kurdish uprising against Saddam began. And as if that wasn’t enough, we stayed with the student, Paiman, whose father started the whole damn thing. Her father was then killed in the 1990s PUK – KDP war, as were the fathers of two of my students from Rania who were with us on the trip. As I’ve mentioned before, every individual here has a story worthy of inclusion in a history book. Paiman’s sisters and mother prepared for us an amazing meal, full of traditional dishes like pumpkin soup, kooba, shfta, salad, and soup, among many, many other things. The next day we ate lunch at my student Zana’s home and were welcomed with an equally plentiful meal. Below you will find pictures of all that Rania has to offer, including the beautiful river Doran. (See pictures below.)

In a nutshell, this brief summary-post brings us up to today. Two days ago was Thanksgiving, and yesterday was Eid al Adha. I am on a five day break from school for the latter, which is the biggest holiday of the Muslim year when family’s slaughter lambs and even turkeys here in Kurdistan. What a coincidence.

Note: I know the pictures are out of order and there are duplicates. I have tried to adjust and fix this for entirely too long and must give up before I drive myself crazy.

Recently, he wrote “10 Questions on Combating Violence“, which is basically a summary of points he made at two different State Dept conferences on how the US should and should not deal with violent extremists around the world.

He couldn’t have hit the nail more precisely on the head if he tried, especially with regard to Questions 5 and 6, my personal favorites. I don’t think there are two more important issues out there; I just couldn’t choose one.

“5. What to do with non-violent Islamist groups? The argument over how to classify different organizations, movements, and individuals has been going on for years.  While the conceptual understanding of intra-Muslim nuance has grown dramatically over the years, it’s not clear to me that clear decisions have been made.  Are non-violent Islamists useful because they embrace democracy, eschew violence, and compete with AQ for recruits and space, or dangerous because they oppose US foreign policy and spread Islamist identity and ideas?  Should they be engaged with as viable partners, tolerated but not engaged, or treated as part of the problem?  How much should this vary by local circumstance?  It’s hard to construct a serious engagement strategy without an answer to this.   And, perhaps of more immediate concern:  what do we expect will happen if these organizations buckle under the weight of repression or pressure, whether in Gaza or Egypt or Jordan or elsewhere? Would this advance or set back American or Western interests, whether in CVE or more broadly?”

I am a mostly firm believer, clearly in the section I underlined. Despite protests by men and women I have spoken to in countries like Syria about this, I tend to believe that if certain Islamist groups are allowed to participate in democratic systems and hence become responsible to the people, radical views they hold will be tempered and they will choose democratic rule over installing their own dictatorships.

“6. Can local partners do the job? Western governments partnering with and helping to build up local Muslim groups which can carry on the fight inside their own communities.  In general, that sounds good — though nobody should expect that this can be done covertly without serious backlash risks, and there should be no expectations of control.   But I’m also struck by the lessons of democracy promotion and civil society building efforts over the years — and the limits of all those partnering and capacity building efforts.  The CVE folks should learn those hard-learned lessons. In general, there are only a limited number of local partners with the capacity and willingness to deal with Western governments on these issue.  They often can’t bear the weight assigned to them. They may risk their local credibility by partnering with governments.  And they may end up spending more of their time chasing the next government contract than doing the kind of community work which first made them interesting. “

The question of what we can and can’t do as foreigners to contribute to the development of legitimate political and civil institutions in places like Iraq is a pressing (and intriguing) one to answer. The matter is also analyzed excellently and thoroughly by Oliver Roy in Politics of Chaos in the Middle East.

They all sported the professional, traditional basketball uniforms: jams, jerseys and high tops. While waiting for their game, I saw many in the stands wearing WNBA and assorted basketball camp T-shirts. And though the crows were slim, there were many cheers and even the classic male hooligan section complete with a drum and annoying cries during the opposing teams’s free shots. (See picture above left.)

General Aziz was kind enough to invite several teachers from AUIS over for a dinner fit for a king and enough food for his army. We had great conversations about topics such as education in the region and Kurdish Arab relations. Though it seems there is a long way to go in building trust and relationships between Kurds and Arabs in power, one teacher/ businessman who was there offered an example of natural reconciliation: his company is about half Kurdish and half Arab, and they worked together on a daily basis. Jobs are an important, if not the most important, part of the moving-on equation.

General Odierno happened to be in the Suli area and dropped by the American University and more specifically dropped by my Debate Club meeting. (My colleague Nate and I started an AUIS Debate Club about a week ago.) The fact that the debate topic for the week was coups provided a great platform for a mini discussion. I called on one of my students, who is at about an intermediate English-speaking level, to explain his perspective on coups to General Odierno: “coups,” he stated,  “are only about money and authority…there is a big difference between coups and revolutions and uprisings…” His point, even in broken English, was profound and dead-on, that coups are not by the people or for the people. Interestingly enough, General Odierno responded with a similar point, albeit with different words: that the most important idea to remember about coups is that there are always two sides, what the orchestrators want the people to think and then the real reasons for the coup. Coup leaders always claim that they are overthrowing the current dictator to restore justice and power to the people, and end up as dictators themselves. We then proceeded to have two formal parliamentary style debates (government v. opposition) on whether a coup is ever legitimate. It was interesting hearing the perspective of individuals who experienced Saddam’s regime; the class was about divided on whether a coup was ever acceptable. Sometimes, one side argued, there is simply no other way.

I mean check out our twin-like arms-crossed stance.

I would have loved to have picked General Odierno’s brain for a while about the surge. Tom Ricks cites him as, in the beginning of the war, intransigent, but then later as one of the key players and strongest advocates, albeit too late, of instituting the COIN based strategy that was the surge. (For an amazingly detailed and thorough account of the surge decision I encourage all to read Ricks’ The Gamble.) While I don’t agree with any of it – the surge might have protected Iraqis in the short-term but its goal was purely American-centric: to provide short-term security so that American government could make an argument for leaving – I laud some for reversing the tragic and unforgivable irresponsible complacency that was the (lack of) policy from 2004-2007. The long-term effectiveness of this strategy is yet to be seen. For example al Sahwa movement (the Awakening) is not yet fully integrated into the army, and security is still a serious pipe dream.

My first burger in Iraq.

But after reading Steve Coll’s (one of my top five favorite people of all time) recent article, “Humility in Afghanistan” in Foreign Policy I could not resist writing a post. In this highly evidenced article, Coll addresses arguments for and against our commitment there and offers important practical solutions for improving the situation, mostly in the form of political negotiations, Afghan style. His article is believable because even though he advocates a continued commitment, he is willing to admit that it might not work. He also addresses Rory Stewart’s article in the London Review of Books, “Irresistible Illusion” from a couple months ago, which resulted in probably the longest post I have ever written. The point in Stewart’s article that really got me was his criticism of how the U.S. frames its policies in Afghanistan in flowery, unrealistic, ideological terms. Coll admits that this is the wrong path; it’s been tried in the past and failed. Stewart, however, reaches the conclusion that this flowery rhetoric is emblematic of our inapplicable on the ground strategy, whereas Coll says drop the talk and start the action: “To succeed, counterinsurgency approaches require deep, supple, and adaptive understanding of local conditions.” Whether this is possible, however, is debatable.

Tom Ricks cites another important highly respected Central Asia scholar’s practical ideas for improving the situation in Afghanistan here: securing the trade routes linking South and Central Asia. Steven Biddle argues against the ‘middle way’ here.

With Steve Coll pulling me one way, and Sarah Chayes and Rory Stewart another, I am one torn Taliba.

General Aziz was kind enough to invite several teachers from AUIS over for a dinner fit for a king and enough food for his army. We had great conversations about topics such as education in the region and Kurdish Arab relations. Though it seems there is a long way to go in building trust and relationships between Kurds and Arabs in power, one teacher/ businessman who was there offered an example of natural reconciliation: his company is about half Kurdish and half Arab, and they worked together on a daily basis. Jobs are an important, if not the most important, part of the moving-on equation.

I mean just check out our twin-like crossed-arm stance.

General Odierno happened to be in the Suli area and dropped by the American University and more specifically dropped by my Debate Club meeting. (My colleague Nate and I started an AUIS Debate Club about a week ago.) The fact that the debate topic for the week was coups provided a great platform for a mini discussion. I called on one of my students, who is at about an intermediate English-speaking level, to explain his perspective on coups to General Odierno: “coups,” he stated,  “are only about money and authority…there is a big difference between coups and revolutions and uprisings…” His point, even in broken English, was profound and dead-on, that coups are not by the people or for the people. Interestingly enough, General Odierno responded with a similar point, albeit with different words: that the most important idea to remember about coups is that there are always two sides, what the orchestrators want the people to think and then the real reasons for the coup. Coup leaders always claim that they are overthrowing the current dictator to restore justice and power to the people, and end up as dictators themselves. We then proceeded to have two formal parliamentary style debates (government v. opposition) on whether a coup is ever legitimate. It was interesting hearing the perspective of individuals who experienced Saddam’s regime; the class was about divided on whether a coup was ever acceptable. Sometimes, one side argued, there is no other way.

I would have loved to have picked General Odierno’s brain for a while about the surge. Tom Ricks cites him as, in the beginning of the war, intransigent but then later as one of the key players and strongest advocates, albeit too late, of instituting the COIN based strategy that was the surge. (For an amazingly detailed and thorough account of the surge decision I encourage all to read Ricks’ The Gamble.) While I don’t agree with any of it – the surge might have protected Iraqis in the short-term but its goal was purely American-centric: to provide short-term security so that American government could make an argument for leaving – I laud some for reversing the tragic and unforgivable irresponsible complacency that was the (lack of) policy from 2004-2007. The long-term effectiveness of this strategy is yet to be seen. For example al Sahwa movement (the Awakening) is not yet fully integrated into the army, and security is still a serious pipe dream.